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ABSTRACT
Much of the literature on choice sets has focused on how alternative specifications of
market scope and site definition impact site selection models and the resulting welfare estimates
per choice occasion. In this paper, choice set definition issues are investigated using the Kuhn-
Tucker model, which integrates the site selection and participation decisions in a unified and
utility theoretic framework. This allows us to consider the impact that alternative site set
definitions may have on both where individuals recreate and the numbers of trips they take. Using
data from the 1997 Iowa Wetlands Survey we examine the effects on estimates and welfare
measures of choice sets representing various levels of site aggregation and market scope. We find
that significant differences in welfare measures arise from changing choice set definitions.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Choice set definition in recreation demand modeling is a complex issue for which
economic theory provides relatively little guidance. Broadly speaking, the issue can be divided
into two areas: the determination of the proper scope of the market (i.e., what goods enter into an
individual’s choice set during the timeframe of interest) and the decision as to how sites are to be
defined and/or aggregated. These decisions must be made both on a conceptual level (e.g.,
considering whether an individual actually knows about all of the available options) and on a
practical level, recognizing the limitations in empirical setting of both the available data and the
ability of the specified model to handle a large number of alternatives. In determining the scope
of the market, for example, attention must be given to both the geographical and horizontal
extents of the market. In the case of recreational day-trips, where the price is determined largely
by a site’s the distance from an individual’s home, the geographical scope can often be effectively
limited via a feasible cut-off distance.
1 However, the horizontal extent of the market (i.e., what
substitute goods to include in the model) is not so cleanly defined. When modeling the demand
for salt water fishing, should one include fresh water alternatives as potential substitutes? When
expanding the geographical scope of the market, more potential substitute activities will
inevitably fall into the expanded geographical region. Should these be included? Is it sufficient to
include expenditures on horizontal substitutes simply as part of a numeraire good, or is important
information lost by not including the characteristics/quality levels of these sites in the model?
There is also an information extent of the market to consider. Sites that are physically
possible for the individual to visit may not, in fact, enter that individual’s decision making
process if they are unaware of the sites’ characteristics or even existence. Horowitz (1991), for
example, considers this problem in the context of job search, arguing that “…the cost of
information often precludes an individual from learning about and applying for all available
jobs.” (p. 1239) Similar information costs and constraints potentially limit the scope of the market2
for the recreator as well. Finally, the definition of a site itself is a nontrivial task. In some
applications, natural boundaries exist (e.g., in the case of small inland lakes), whereas in others
(e.g., in the case of a major river system) a continuum of sites exists. Unfortunately, site
definitions are driven as often as not by practical limitations in terms of the data or the model
being estimated, despite the fact that different decisions on choice set can lead to significant
differences in the welfare measures obtained.
2
Conceptually and practically related to the choice set definition issues is the challenge of
modeling corners in recreation demand. Corner solutions are common in this setting because
individuals typically visit only a subset of the available sites, setting the demand for the
remaining sites to zero. There is growing literature on methods for dealing with corner solutions
in recreation demand (see Herriges, Kling and Phaneuf 1999 for a recent review). The prevalence
of corner solutions is linked to choice set definition decisions. An increase in the market scope to
be analyzed will invariably lead to more corner solutions, as options are added in which not all
individuals will partake. Conversely, a high degree of aggregation will decrease the number of
corner solutions, as previously individual sites are lumped together, increasing the likelihood of a
visit to one of the aggregated sites. At the extreme, choice set definition determines the types of
model that can be feasibly estimated, which in turn influences the resulting welfare estimates.
Single site or pooled models, which by definition require either a restricted scope or a high level
of aggregation, will typically produce results different from models that can be estimated for a
larger number of sites, such as Morey, Rowe and Watson’s (1993) repeated nested logit models
(RUMs) or linked models that combine site selection and participation decisions (See, e.g.
Herriges, Kling, and Phaneuf 1999).
Our objective in this paper is to bring recent developments in the literature on corner
solutions, and in particular the Kuhn-Tucker (KT) model (e.g., Wales and Woodland 1983 and
Phaneuf, Kling and Herriges 2000), to bear on the choice set definition debate. The KT
framework is attractive for two reasons. First, much of the literature on choice set definition has3
focused on how alternative specifications impact site selection models and the resulting welfare
estimates per choice occasion. For example, Parsons and Needelman (1992), Feather (1994), and
Kaoru, Smith and Oiu (1995) consider how site aggregation alters welfare calculations, whereas
Peters, Adamowicz and Boxall (1995) and Parsons and Hauber (1998) emphasize the importance
of scope specification.
3 The Kuhn-Tucker model, however, integrates the site selection and
participation decisions in a unified and utility theoretic framework. This allows us to consider the
impact that alternative site set definitions may have on both where individuals recreate and the
numbers of trips they take. Second, because the KT model starts with the familiar direct utility
function, well-known results on aggregation in general literature can be brought to bear in terms
of both the specification of and testing for alternative aggregation schemes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief overview
of the KT model. This framework is then used to model the demand for recreational activities in
Iowa wetlands. The underlying data set is detailed in section III. Section IV provides the
empirical specification and the resulting parameter estimates using different levels of site
aggregation and geographical scope. We then examine the effects that various choice set
specifications have on the welfare estimates associated with changes in site characteristics and
access. Section V provides a discussion and suggestions for future research.
II.  KUHN-TUCKER MODEL
Wales and Woodland (1983) and Hanemann (1978) independently suggested the Kuhn-
Tucker model for estimation of consumer preferences when binding non-negativity constraints
are present in the observed data.
4 The model begins with utility maximization subject to income
and non-negativity constraints. The first order conditions, given the potential for non-
consumption of a subset of the goods, take the form of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Formally the
consumer is assumed to solve the standard utility maximization problem
, m a x (,,,,) . . , 0 , i z uz s t y z x γε ′ =+ ≥
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where  1 ( ,..., )' M x x = x  is a vector of visits to available recreation sites,  1 ( ,..., )' M p p = p  is a vector
of prices,  y  denotes income,  z  is a numeraire good representing spending on all other goods,
1 ( ,..., )' M qq = q  is a vector of attributes of the recreation sites,  1 ( ,..., )' M ε εε =  is a vector of
unobserved random components, and γ  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Assuming the
numeraire good is necessary, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem take the form
;0 ; 0 ,1 , . . . , , jj z j j jj z up u x x up u j M  ≤≥− = =  (2)
where  j u  indicates the partial derivative of utility with respect to  j x . Given specific assumptions
on the structure of the utility function, the first order conditions in (2) can be rewritten as
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where  () j g ⋅  is a function of observed variables and parameters to be estimated, determined by the
choice of functional form for utility.
Assuming the random variables are distributed via the density function  () fε ε , the
probability of observing an individual’s outcome in the data can be constructed from (3). For
example, if the first k  goods are positively consumed, the probability of this outcome is given by
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where  k J  is a Jacobean transformation term. A probability as in (4) can be computed for each
individual in the sample, and maximum likelihood used to recover estimates of the parameter
vector. Because of the non-negativity constraints, the demand system, and hence the indirect
utility function of interest for welfare analysis, is non-differentiable. If there are M  recreation
sites available, the individual will have 2
M  different combinations of sites that can be visited,
including the possibility of not visiting any recreation sites during the season. Let
{ } { } { } { } { } { } { } , 1 , 2 ,, , 1 , 2 ,, 1 , ,, 1 , 2 , M MM Ω≡ ∅    (5)5
denote the collection of all possible demand patterns (i.e., subsets of  { } 1, 2, , I M =  ) and
() ,,,, vy ωω γ ε pq denote the indirect utility function when the individual is restricted to the
commodities indexed by ω ∈Ω (i.e.,  0 j xj ω =∀ ∉ ). The individual’s unconditional indirect
utility function is then given by
{ } (,,,,) m a x ( ,,,,). vy v y ωω ω γ ε γ ε
∈Ω = pq p q (6)
As a side note, the structure of preferences in (6) highlights the conceptual similarities
between the RUM and KT models. In each case preferences are characterized up to an
unobserved error term. It is assumed consumers make a choice among discrete alternatives. In
RUMs, consumers chose which site to visit on a given choice occasion, while in the KT model
they chose the visitation pattern (ω ∈Ω) for the season. The models differ in that the RUM
restricts the analysis to a single choice occasion; thus, choices involving multiple sites are not
possible and scale (the number of trips to each site) information is not incorporated. The KT
model uses additional information, adding the scale dimension and allowing multiple trips to
various sites. In this sense, the KT model can be seen as a generalization of the RUM.
III.  THE IOWA WETLANDS DATA
The data used in this application come from the 1997 Iowa Wetlands Survey conducted at
Iowa State University. The purpose of the survey was to gather information on how Iowans use
wetlands in the state, as well as their attitudes towards wetland preservation/restoration
programs.
6 The survey included a variety of questions soliciting actual and hypothetical use of
wetlands, as well as contingent valuation and behavior questions. Finally, detailed demographic
characteristics and information for constructing travel prices were gathered. This study focuses on
the visitation data. The behavioral data are augmented by pheasant count data, provided by the
Iowa Department of Natural Resources.6
A sample of 6000 Iowa households was drawn from the general population and from
state hunting and fishing license holders and sent a mail survey, from which 3131 useable surveys
were returned.
7 As part of the survey, each individual was provided a copy of the map in Figure
1, dividing the state into 15 zones.
8 Individuals were asked to record the number of trips made to
wetlands in each of the zones during 1997. For this application, 2891 respondents are used, of
whom roughly two-thirds visited a wetland in the state during 1997.
Given the site visitation data, the next task is to define choice sets for the models to be
applied. In part, this specification depends on the goals of the empirical study. We may wish to
consider the demand for and policies affecting wetlands in the entire state. Conversely, we may
be interested in a particular resource in the state, such as the Des Moines lobe of the Prairie
Pothole Region. The Prairie Pothole Region is a large, fairly unique section of North American,
encompassing parts of Iowa, Minnesota, the Dakotas, and the Canadian plains provinces. The
area is dotted with indentations, in otherwise flat landscapes, that are wet for at least part of the
year. This type of wetland is ideal habitat for many types of wildlife, including ducks and
pheasants (most of the continents ducks breed in this area), and has importance at both the
continental and local levels. The Iowa portion of the Prairie Pothole Region corresponds roughly
to zones 4, 5 and 8 in Figure 1. Choice set definitions may also be made based on the desire to
limit the dimension of the models applied.
9 This may lead one to consider restricted levels of
market scope and increased site aggregation in an empirical model.
In order to illustrate the impact of these choice set decisions, we consider four models in
this study, summarized by the varying degrees of scope and aggregation depicted in Figure 2.
Model A represents the largest scope combined with the lowest level of aggregation, modeling
the demand for recreation in the entire state and defining sites as the fifteen zones.
10 Model B is
conceptually similar to A, considering demand for recreation in the entire state, but with sites
aggregated such that individuals chose from among five “mega-zones”. Corresponding to Figure
1, the aggregate sites are defined as {1,2,3}, {4,5,8}, {6,7,12}, {9,10,11}, and {13,14,15}. Care7
has been taken to aggregate sites exhibiting similar geographical features, with the Prairie Pothole
Region and east and west riverine wetland regions being grouped respectively. The final two
definitions consider limiting the scope of the choice set, focusing on demand for recreation in the
Prairie Pothole sites. Model C considers the demand for trips to the three disaggregate Prairie
Pothole sites (zones 4, 5 and 8), while Model D combines these sites into a single good, resulting
in a one-site model.
11 In the restricted scope models, expenditures on visits to the other sites are
included, but only as a component of the numeraire good. In this sense the restricted scope
models represent higher degrees of horizontal aggregation, leaving out characteristics of the
excluded sites. In the following sections we apply the KT model to each of these choice set
definitions.
IV.  EMPRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS
Estimation of the KT model requires specification of the functional form for utility and
the choice of distribution for the error terms. Following Phaneuf, Kling, and Herriges (2000) we
choose as our utility function a version of the linear expenditure system. The consumer’s direct
utility function is given by
1
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where  j Ψ  is a quality index give by  01 ( , ) exp( ) jjj j j qp h ε δδ ε Ψ= + + , and  j ph  is a site quality
variable equal to the pheasant count in the 
th j  site if the individual indicated possession of a
hunting or fishing license and equal to zero otherwise. The price of visiting zone j for individual i
( ij p ) was constructed by first establishing the roundtrip travel distance ( ij d ) and travel time ( ij t )
from their residence to the center of wetland zone j using the software package PCMiler. The
price was then constructed as  0.22 (0.33 ) ij ij i ij p dw t =+ , where  i w  denotes the individual’s
marginal wage rate. Simple averages were used to construct price and quality variables for the
aggregate mega-zones.8
The linear expenditure system is a somewhat restrictive specification for utility. The
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which is limiting in the types of substitution patterns captured between sites. This specification,
however, combined with the assumption that the random terms are distributed independent and
identical extreme value, makes it feasible to estimate relatively large dimensional models.
12 The
probability of observing an individual in demand regime ω  has a closed form given by
1
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Jω  denotes the Jacobean transformation from  1 ( ,..., )' M ε ε  to  1 ( ,..., )' M x x , and v  is a scale
parameter in the extreme value distribution. A probability term such as in (9) can be calculated
for each individual in the sample, and maximum likelihood used to recover estimates of the utility
function parameters.
The results from estimating each of the four models using the entire survey sample are
presented in Table 1. All of parameters are found to be significantly different from zero at one-
percent critical level. In and of themselves the parameters estimates are not interesting, except to
note that the parameter associate with pheasant counts ( 1 δ ) is positive and statistically significant.
This indicates that pheasant counts positively influence both overall utility and the number of
trips to a given region. A comparison across the models suggest that the scale and pheasant count9
parameter estimates are relatively stable, while there are noticeable differences in the estimates of
θ  and  0 δ .
Of greater interest are the welfare implications of the four models, presented in Table 2.
We examine three scenarios, each reflecting different potential policy concerns. Scenario I
examines the effect of policies that would increase pheasant counts statewide by twenty percent,
whereas under Scenario II the pheasant counts are altered only in the Prairie Pothole Region.
Scenario III attempts to assess the recreational value of the Prairie Pothole Region as a whole by
examining the welfare effects of eliminating the resource. As previously noted, the various levels
of scope and aggregation in the four models may affect the reported welfare measures.
The results in Table 2 indicate that, for this application, site aggregation consistently
reduces the estimated welfare effects, regardless of the scope specification or the scenario being
considered. The reductions range from just over eighteen percent in the case of Scenario III (for
Models C versus D) to fifty-eight percent in the case of Scenario I (again for Models C versus D).
These findings are consistent with earlier studies by Kaoru, Smith and Oiu (1995) and Feather
(1994), though Parsons and Needelman (1992) typically found the aggregation bias to go in the
opposite direction.
Limiting the geographical scope of the model also results in reduced welfare predictions.
This is what one would expect for Scenario I.  Models C and D, which restrict the scope of the
market to the Prairie Pothole region, produce substantially lower welfare measures when
compared to their statewide counterparts simply because they ignore the benefits of the improved
pheasant counts outside of the Prairie Pothole Region. This is a direct result of the lack of
characteristic data for the excluded sites, for which expenditures on are only included in the
numeraire.
On the other hand, the explanation for the differences in the magnitudes between
Scenarios II and III is less obvious. One a priori belief is that by limiting the scope of the market10
to the Prairie Pothole Region, we are excluding all other possible substitute wetland sites, making
the modeled wetland sites more unique in the household’s choice set. This would in turn increase
the magnitudes of the welfare loss stemming from their elimination. Indeed, this is exactly what
Parsons and Hauber (1998) found when they used spatial boundaries to limit the choice set. A
second a priori belief is that the differences between the full and limited scope models should be
small, since the numeraire good allows inclusion of expenditures on the non-modeled wetland
sites, and the quality change occurs in all cases for sites which are fully modeled.
13 The results
seem to lean towards the second interpretation. . In particular, the welfare estimates from a
limited scope models (C and D) are smaller in magnitude than those from their full scope
counterparts (A and B respectively). Interestingly as well, the effect of this horizontal aggregation
on sites into the numeraire good is consistent with the direction of the effect for the geographical
aggregation mentioned above.
This would seem to be the opposite of the findings of Parsons and Hauber (1998). There
is, however, a key distinction between the scope restrictions employed by these authors and the
one being considered here. In their paper, geographical scope is defined uniquely for each
individual in the sample, with sites included or excluded from the individual’s choice set based on
their distance from the individual’s home. As a result, the sites that are first excluded from the
choice set are those that are the furthest from the individual’s home and, typically, represent low
probability trips. This form of scope restriction is helpful when the analyst has available data on
trips a large number of sites and wishes to reduces the dimensionality of the estimation problem.
Parsons and Hauber (1998) show that excluding far flung sites from the choice set has little
impact on the welfare estimates, with these sites are assigned a very low probability in the RUM
framework.
The scope restrictions reflected in Table 2, however, are quite different. In moving from
Models A and B to Models C and D, respectively, we are not excluding remote sites. On the
contrary, for the majority of the sample we are excluding their primary wetland visitation sites,11
since most of the sample lives outside of the Prairie Pothole Region. This mimics what might
occur in an empirical setting in which data are available on trips to a specific region, including
visits by individual that live far from the sites of interest, but data are unavailable on sites that are
the primary recreation areas for these remote individuals. By restricting the geographical scope,
we are relying on both relatively few wetland sites to capture preferences for wetlands and a
relatively small proportion of the sample, since individuals from outside the Prairie Pothole
Region will be at corners in the KT model.
The findings in Parsons and Hauber (1998) partially emerge, however, if we restrict our
analysis to individuals living in the Prairie Pothole Region. For these individuals, limiting the
analysis to the Prairie Pothole sites (as in Models C and D) is comparable to using the spatial
boundaries of Parsons and Hauber (1998). The resulting parameter estimates and welfare
predictions are provided in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. For this restricted sample, we again find
that aggregation reduces the estimated welfare effects in Scenarios I through III, with the
reductions ranging from ten to sixty-one percent. However, the scope effects now move in the
opposite directions. For Scenario I, we continue to find that the limited scope models understate
the gains from statewide improvements in the pheasant counts. However, for Scenarios II and III,
ignoring the substitute sites outside of the Prairie Pothole Region (as we do in Models C and D)
results in welfare estimates that are up to seventy-two percent higher than if we include these
substitute sites in the model.
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS
The results presented above in many ways confirm the difficult nature of determining
choice set definitions. In general, there is no obvious answer, leaving the analyst to make
decisions based on his best judgement. A priori, we had expected site aggregation would not
significantly affect the reported welfare measures, since the aggregation was done over fairly
homogeneous resources. Yet, for this application aggregation consistently led to reduced welfare12
estimates. Conversely, our expectations were that scope limitation would affect welfare measures.
Specifically, in limiting the scope of the market we are reducing the number of explicitly modeled
substitutes, which would in turn make the modeled sites appear more unique, increasing the
magnitudes of the estimated welfare effects. This result emerged when the scope restrictions were
analogous to those employed by Parsons and Hauber (1998), providing spatial boundaries that
eliminated remote sites. However, in the full sample, when the geographical scope restrictions
eliminated sites frequently visited by much of the population, the welfare estimates were biased
downwards. This perhaps supports the hypothesis that including horizontal substitutes in a
numeraire good does not lead to large upward bias in welfare estimates, provided we are only
considering changes in the attributes of explicitly modeled sites.
In the end, the choice set issue is also a data and data collection issue requiring pragmatic
decisions by the analyst. The specification of choice sets remains as much art as science. We can
never hope to gather information about all possible substitutes for all individuals. However, there
are perhaps a few simple guidelines that can be followed. First, when gathering data on resource
use, every effort should be made to survey not only resource users, but also non-users. This will
enable us to model the “non-participation” decision, allowing an aggregation of all horizontal
substitutes for the resource of interest. Next, it may be possible to geographically segment the
sample population and identify the most likely substitutes for the resource of interest for each
segment. This could then be included in the choice sets for the specific sub-sample. This would,
or course, require econometric methods capable of handling this heterogeneous specification,
proving a direction for further research in the KT model.
Finally, we note that, while the above analysis provides the first empirical investigation
into site set definition using the KT framework rather than a single choice occasion RUM model,
there are a number of other avenues for future research using the KT model. First, as suggested
above, some of the results may be driven in part by the linear expenditure system’s functional
form, rather than underlying preferences. It would be useful to revisit this problem using a more13
flexible function form. Second, because analysis has generally focused on single choice occasion
RUM models rather than fully utility consistent systems models, little attention has been paid to
the micro foundations of aggregation in recreation demand. As we have done in this study,
aggregation is typically accomplished via ad hoc averaging of component-site prices and quality
measures. It is likely that different aggregation decisions and/or calculation of aggregate prices
and quality would affect welfare results. Future research may call on the mature literature
addressing aggregation in other areas of consumer choice (see, e.g., Varian 1992, section 9.3,
Deaton and Muellbauer 1980, part 2, or Blackorby, Primont and Russell 1978) that can be readily
applied within the KT framework. For example, Lupi and Feather (1998) suggest that there may
be advantages to the aggregation of “collateral” sites to keep estimation tractable while allowing a
larger market scope. This could be accomplished in the KT model by specifying the collateral
sites as homothetically separable from the sites of primary interest, allowing for a theoretically
consistent two-stage budgeting model. Under this specification, income would be first allocated
between, say, remote trips, local trips and other goods, with a second stage modeling the
allocation of local trip expenditures among the local sites. Consistent price and quantity indices
could be constructed for the various commodity bundles, rather than relying upon average prices
and total trips.
14 Furthermore, the assumption of homothetic separability could be explicitly
tested.14



















































Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. All parameter estimates are significantly different
from zero at 1% level.









































Notes: Welfare measures are in dollars per respondent per year. Standard errors on the welfare
measures were constructed using a bootstrap procedure.
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Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. All parameter estimates are significantly different
from zero at 1% level.

































III.  Loss of prairie






Notes: Welfare measures are in dollars per respondent per year. Standard errors on the welfare
measures were constructed using a bootstrap procedure.16
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Figure 1: Iowa Wetland Zones
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Kuhn-Tucker model.
5 In particular, it is assumed that  0, 0   and 0  zj k j j uu k j u j ε εε =∂∂ = ∀ ≠ ∂∂ > ∀ .
6 While Iowa wetlands obviously do not fall into category of marine resources, the choice
set definition challenges associated with this data set are similar to those facing analysts using
marine recreation data. The survey itself is part of a larger project to examine the value of21
                                                                                                                                                             
wetlands in Iowa. For details on the survey process and discussion of the project’s wider goals,
including wetland definitions and discussion of the importance of wetland conservation, see
Azevedo (1999) or Herriges, Kling, and Azevdo (1999).
7 A series of focus groups and a pre-test of 600 Iowa households were used to develop the
survey instrument prior to its final administration to the full sample of 6000 households. The
sample was stratified to insure users were included in the final survey sample, with 4000
households drawn from the general residential population and 2000 households drawn from
fishing and hunting license holders. An overall survey response rate of 58% was achieved among
the deliverable surveys. See Azevedo (1999) for additional details.
8 While the zones were specified along county boundaries, they were also selected so as
to reflect broadly homogeneous wetland types within the state, such as the riverine wetlands
along the eastern and western borders of the state (i.e., zones 1, 2, 3, 13, 14, and 15) versus the
prairie pothole wetlands in north-central Iowa (zones 4, 5, and 8).
9 For example, in our application of the KT model to the demand for Wisconsin Great
Lakes fishing trips (see Phaneuf, Kling and Herriges 2000), we aggregate data on 22 possible
destinations to 4 sites. This was done primarily to reduce the dimension of the model being
estimated.
10 We note that, due the nature of the original survey instrument, we only have available
data from sites that have already been substantially aggregated. Thus, it is not all together proper
to call Model A a disaggregate model, except in relation to the others.
11 It is worth noting again that while the aggregation restrictions used in the KT model are
similar to those often used in RUM’s, the scope restrictions are somewhat different. Analysts
employing the standard RUM framework have typically restricted the choice set for the
individual by some criteria, allowing the choice sets to potentially be of different magnitudes
across individuals, while in this paper KT model’s choice set has been restricted to be the same22
                                                                                                                                                             
for all individuals. Thus, it is the geographic scope of the resource to be examined in detail, rather
than the individual’s geographic scope. Another perspective on the scope restrictions considered
in this paper comes from noting that the Prairie Pothole wetlands are different from the riverine
and small pond wetlands elsewhere in the state. Thus, the scope restriction employed here is
analogous to say excluding inland fisheries when studying marine fisheries along the East Coast.
Finally, we note that, conceptually, there is nothing preventing the KT model from employing
individual specific scope restrictions. The computing coding would simply be more complex.
12 In addition, the level of restriction implied by the LES system is similar to the use of
linear functional forms in most applications of random utility models. The KT model provides the
added benefit that welfare measures reflect seasonal, rather than the loosely defined choice
occasion, measures. The extreme value distribution was chosen in this case for simplicity. A
generalized extreme value distribution could have been employed as well, at the expense of more
time consuming in the welfare calculation procedures. Expressions for the Jacobean
transformation terms, as well as example programs written in GAUSS for estimation and welfare
calculations of various dimensional KT models using the LES utility function, are available from
the authors upon request.
13 We appreciate the comments on an anonymous reviewer, who clarified this second
point.
14 Shaw and Shonkwiler (1999) have suggested an alternative approach to constructing
consistent site aggregates, relying instead on Hicksian separability. In particular, as travel costs
are typical assumed to be proportional to round-trip travel time and/or travel distance, the price of
visiting sites moves essentially in a fixed proportion with changes in costs per mile, satisfying the
conditions for Hicksian aggregation. Their suggestion is to use total miles driven as the means of
aggregating multiple trips, rather than total number of trips.23
                                                                                                                                                             
15 Standard errors were not constructed for the 15-good model due to time limitations in
completing the manuscript for this special issue. Computation of the standard errors in case, while
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1.  INTRODUCTION
A large literature on the valuation of environmental quality changes based upon
behavioral data on use of the environment has developed over the past thirty years. These models
have been variously referred to as recreation demand, travel cost, and/or revealed preference
models and have employed a variety of demand and /or random utility estimation techniques. The
purpose of these models has been, almost without exception, to estimate the value of the direct
use of these resources. Thus, the surplus measures estimated have often been referred to as “use”
values.
Mäler's (1974) concept of weak complementarity has periodically been invoked to justify
the focus on use values. In brief, the property of weak complementarity implies that if an
individual does not directly use an environmental good, he or she places no value on changes in
the quality attributes of that good. Hence, there is no value associated with environmental quality
except that which accrues from using the good. Most discussions of weak complementarity begin
and end with comments along these lines. Thus, although numerous revealed preference (RP)
models invoke weak complementarity, few papers give serious attention to empirical
specification of RP models or their interpretation in its absence.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the measurement of welfare from revealed
preference models in which weak complementary does not hold. It is important that we note at
the outset that pure “existence value” (as we will define it later) simply cannot be estimated from
revealed preference data. This well-understood point is not in contention here. Rather, we are
simply interested in what complications arise to computing welfare estimates from revealed
preference models in the absence of weak complementarity. For example, if weak
complementarity does not hold, what is the appropriate interpretation of the traditionally
computed welfare measures (i.e., areas under the estimated demand curve)? Does the lack of
weak complementarity bias the estimate of this value? What interpretation might the analyst give
to the residual value that is present even when demand is zero? Should the welfare analyst impose2
weak complementarity for estimation purposes even when he or she suspects its absence?
A number of authors have decomposed total value into use value and existence value
associated with changes in environmental quality relying upon weak complementarity to define
the two pieces (Madariaga and McConnell, 1987). Freeman (1993) identifies three components of
value: use value, pure existence value (value placed on environmental quality completely
independent of use), and non-use value (value the individual gets that is related to use, but which
does not disappear when the good is not consumed). Hanemann (1988) defines non-use and use
value, but employs a definition that does not invoke weak complementarity to distinguish the two.
In this paper, we build on these definitions with a specific focus on identifying the pieces of total
value that are recoverable or at least potentially recoverable from revealed preference approaches
(and correspondingly, which pieces are not). Our motivation for revisiting this theme is
pragmatic. As noted above, typical application of revealed preference (e.ge. RUM’s) models have
maintained the assumption of weak complementarity, eliminating the need for discussion on how
benefits measures from behavioral data should be interpreted. In contrast, recent applications of
the Kuhn-Tucker model (see e.g. Phaneuf, et al., 2000) have not a priori assumed weak
complementarity in the functional form for preferences, allowing for the possibility that weak
complementarity will not hold for the estimated preference structure. This has necessitated
discussion on what is the proper welfare measures for this class of revealed preference model.
After developing the concepts in the next two sections, we empirically investigate these
issues using a data set on wetland usage in the state of Iowa. Six thousand residents were sampled
in the spring of 1998. Data on the number of visits they took to wetland areas in the state and the
costs of those visits were collected, along with a variety of socioeconomic data and other relevant
information. This data set provides a rich basis upon which to investigate these issues.
2.  THE COMPONENTS OF VALUE EXPOSED BY REVEALED PREFERENCE DATA
As noted above, numerous authors have defined and decomposed value into various
pieces. Here, we adopt and modify slightly the model suggested by Hanemann (1988). The main3
purpose for the decomposition is to aid our understanding of the inherent limitations on the
empirical welfare measures that can be extracted from revealed preference data.
The decomposition process begins by specifying a general structure of consumer
preferences that will accommodate both traditional use value and the more controversial indirect
use and existence value components. Hanemann (1988) assumes that the direct utility function
takes the form
() ,, UT u q q   =   x (1)
where x is a vector of private market goods and q (a scalar) is a public good (e.g., environmental
amenity) taken as given by the individual consumer;  () , Tu q is increasing in u and q; and
() , uq x  is increasing and quasi-concave in x and q. Note that q enters utility in two separate
places, in a group with the private goods (x) and separably on its own. Importantly, the marginal
rates of substitution between observed consumption bundles (the x’s) will be independent of the
second component of the utility function and thus cannot reveal information about the value of
changes in that portion of the function.
1
The corresponding indirect utility function is then given by:
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where  () ( ) { } ,, , vq yM a x uq y ′ ≡≤
x px p x . Again, as the second line of equation (2) emphasizes,
all of the interactions between the consumer’s activity in the marketplace (including recreational
demand) and the public good q are revealed through  () ,, vq y p  and independent of the form of
() , Tq ⋅ . Consequently, revealed preference data simply cannot be used to estimate the form of
() , Tq ⋅ .
Finally, we can specify the corresponding expenditure function as:4
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where  () , uUq    is defined implicitly by  [ ] , Tuq U =    and  () ( ) { } ,, , eq uM i n uqu ′ ≡≥
x pp x x    denotes
the standard expenditure function.
2 Note that the utility level at which the traditional expenditure
function is evaluated is adjusted for the second role of q in preferences and that generally
() () ,, ,, E qu e qu ≠ pp  .
Turning to welfare valuations, it is natural to define the total compensating variation
(
T C ) for change in the level of the resource from 
0 q  to 
1 q  as
() ( )
00 0 01 1 ,,, ,, , .
T Tv q yq Tv qy C q    =−    pp (4)
Hanemann (1988) suggests the following decomposition:
TR CCC =+  (5)
where 
R C  is implicitly defined by
() ( )
00 0 01 0 ,,, ,, ,
R Tv q yq Tv qy C q    =−    pp (6)
and C   satisfies
() ()
00 0 00 1 ,,, ,, , Tv q yq Tv q y C q    =−    pp  .( 7 )
Notice that 
R C  compensates for the impact that the change in q has on the first argument in
() , T ⋅⋅ , whereas C   compensates for the impact of the change on the second argument of  () , T ⋅⋅ .
Unfortunately, the decomposition in (5) holds only if the marginal utility of income is constant.
3
However, the following modified version of equation (5) can be used:
TRE CCC =+ (8)
where 
E C  is implicitly defined by5
() ( )
01 0 01 1 ,, , ,, ,
RR E Tv qy q Tv qy C q    =−    pp .( 9 )
and 
R R y yC ≡− . Comparing equations (4), (6), and (9), it is clear that we have is a sequential
compensation for the change in q , with:
() ( )
()
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R C  in the first line of equation (10) is used to offset the impact that the change
in q has on  () ,, vq y p . In contrast, 
E C  denotes the additional compensation required to make the
individual whole; i.e., compensating for the impact that the change in q has on the second
argument in  () , Tq ⋅  given 
R C  has already been paid.
4 Throughout the remainder of the paper, we
refer to 
R C  as the revealable portion of compensation and 
E C  as existence value.
5 Note that this
definition of existence value makes no use of the property of weak complementarity (as others
have often done in the definition of existence value). It is worth reemphasizing one final time that
this piece of value cannot be recovered from revealed preference data. This inherent limitation of
revealed preference is well known and will receive no further attention here.
6
Rather, our focus will turn to the remaining piece, which we have termed 
R C . This piece
is of particular interest because it describes the portion of preferences about which we can
potentially infer something from revealed preference data. The next question is how much of 
R C
can be inferred from revealed preference data. This is where Mäler's concept of weak
complementarity becomes helpful. We note that 
R C  can itself be decomposed into pieces as
follows:
R UI U CCC =+ (11)
with 
IU C  implicitly defined by
() ()
00 11 ,, ,,
IU vq q yvq q y C    =−    pp  , (12)6
where  () q p   denotes the price vector at which x = 0 (in general dependant on q), and
UR I U CCC ≡−. It seems intuitive to refer to 
IU C  as the “indirect use” value, as it represents
welfare changes when the associated market goods are not in use, whereas 
U C  corresponds to
direct “use” value.
7 The components 
U C  and 
IU C  can be equivalently defined in terms of the
expenditure function as:
 8
() { } () { }
00 0 00 10 1 10 ,, ,, ,, ,,
U C e qu e q qu e qu e q qu      =− −−      pp pp  (13)
and
() ()
00 0 11 0 ,, ,,
IU Ce q q ue q q u    =−    pp  . (14)
where  ()
00 ,, uvq y = p . Mäler's assumption of weak complementarity recognizes that if
() ()
00 11 ,, ,, vq q yvq q y   =   pp  (15)
then  0
IU C =  and 
UR CC = , capturing all of the value of a change in q. Further, 
U C  can be












C x pq u d p x pq u d p −− =−  pp

(16)
where  1 − p  represents the vector of all prices except for good 1and  ()
10
11 1 ,, , x pq u − p  denotes the
Hicksian demand for good 1. This is a very handy result for applied welfare analysts as it means
that once a demand function is estimated, the welfare change associated with a change in quality
can be computed via (16)
9. There is no need to explicitly specify the underlying expenditure or
indirect utility function. Of course, if the analyst knows the underlying expenditure or indirect
utility function, they can be used directly to compute 
U C .
However, it is the circumstances under which (15) does not hold that interest us here. In
this case, the computation of 
R C  does not equal 
U C  from (16). The question then becomes
which, if either, of these two welfare measures is meaningful? To answer this question, we need a7
better understanding of why weak complementarity might fail to hold in an empirical setting. In
the next section, we explore this issue by considering possible explanations for violations of weak
complementarity.
3.  RATIONALE FOR OBSERVING VIOLATIONS OF WEAK COMPLEMENTARITY
Violations of weak complementarity have rarely been observed in empirical studies of
recreation demand largely because the dominant modeling framework (i.e., RUM’s) implicitly
imposes it. However, in recent efforts to employ the Kuhn-Tucker approach of Wales and
Woodland (1983) to recreation demand, weak complementarity has been soundly rejected as a
restriction on preferences.
10 In this section, we consider three possible rationales for these
apparent violations and examine the implications for applied research. First, there may be one or
more goods that form the set of goods that are weakly complementary to q. Madariaga and
McConnell (1987) consider this possibility when they note that their definition of existence value
includes off site use values. Bockstael and Kling (1988) derive the appropriate welfare measures
if all of the weakly complementary demands are estimated and used for welfare computation. If
the analyst has included only one of the goods in the empirical model, the omitted variables may
show up as a rejection of weak complementarity. Second, the absence of weak complementarity
may be a direct result of the individual's preference for environmental quality. For example, in the
context of the household production framework, environmental quality may be an essential good
in the production of environmental services, whereas x may not be.
11 Finally, estimation of
preferences which are not weakly complementary to q may stem from econometric issues such as
model specification and/or measurement errors. In this section, we discuss each of these
explanations in turn. We consider their implications for specifying empirical models of revealed
preferences as well as the appropriate computation and interpretation of welfare measures coming
from such models.
3.1. Weak Complementarity with Sets of Goods – An Omitted Variables Story
Bockstael and Kling (1988) derive welfare measures for changes in environmental8
quality when quality is weakly complementary to a set of goods. Suppose there are two goods
that are weak complements to q,  1 x  and  2 x . This means that when both  1 x  and  2 x  equal zero, the
marginal utility of q is also zero. Bockstael and Kling demonstrate that in this case, the correct
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C x pq pqu d p x pq pqu d p    =−    

  . (19)
In terms of expenditure functions, 
R C  can be expressed equivalently as
() ()
0 000 0 010
12 12 ,,, ,, ,
RU CC




Our point of departure is to consider what happens when the analyst either does not know
or cannot measure  2 x  and thus cannot estimate the second demand function. Further, the analyst
cannot include the price of  2 x  in the estimating equation for  1 x , possibly generating biased
coefficient estimates for the first demand equation, depending of course on the correlation
patterns between the omitted variable and the included ones.
What are the implications of this mis-specification for welfare measurement? Obviously, the
analyst cannot estimate the sum of areas as represented in (17) since  2 x  is unknown. However, the9
analyst might be able to recover an unbiased estimate of  1
U C  in (18). Further, the analyst might be
able to use knowledge of the form of the expenditure function underlying the estimated demand
model to compute some part of 
R C . We are interested in identifying the circumstances under which
1
U C  and/or 
R C  might be recovered from RP estimates. As suggested earlier, the answer depends on
the correlation patterns between the omitted and included variables.
Suppose first that the omitted price of good 2 is not correlated with any of the other
independent variables in the first demand equation. If  2 x  represents magazines, books, videos, and/or
other non-consumption items related to q, the assumption of complete independence may be quite
reasonable (in fact,  2 p  might be nearly constant across the sample). For intuition in considering the
econometric implications, suppose the true demands for both goods are linear; i.e.,
1,2; iii i i j i x ppq i j i αβ γ δ =+ + + = ≠ . (21)
Standard omitted variables results indicate that the estimation of the demand for  1 x  in this
circumstance will result in unbiased coefficient estimates for each of the slope parameters, but a
biased constant term with
0
11 2 2 () E p αα β =+ (22)
where 
0
2 p is the sample average price of  2 x . The sign of the bias to the intercept will depend upon the
relationship between  1 x  and  2 x ; if they are substitutes, the constant term will be biased upwards, if
they are complements the bias will be downwards.
What are the implications for welfare measurement? Because each individual's  2 p  is
unknown and cannot be included in the estimating equation, the demand equation is conditioned
on the sample average 
0
2 p  rather than the individual's actual  2 p . The estimated welfare for each
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Unfortunately, the sign of this bias is generally indeterminate both for any individual and when
summed over the sample.
13 However, two conditions under which this bias will be small are
clear: (1) when  2 p  does not vary across the sample then 
00
22 p p =  and there is no bias, and (2)
when  12 / x p ∂∂ = 0 or is small, the bias will also be nonexistent or small.
We now turn to the prospects in this case for the estimation of 
R C . Recall that 
R C  can be
written as in (20) as the difference between two expenditure functions. Are these recoverable?
The answer is yes, but like the recovery of  1
U C , they can only be evaluated at the "wrong" value
of  2 p . To see why, note that if we know the Hicksian demand (as required to compute  1
U C ), we
can integrate it over price to recover the expenditure function. Like the demand, the expenditure
function will be a function of the own price ( 1 p ), q, and the sample average of the price of the
second good (
0
2 p ) (embedded in the parameter estimates). Thus, computation of the difference in
expenditure functions evaluated at the current own price and changes in q is equivalent to
() ()









yielding a bias of
() () () ()
0 000 0 010 0 000 0 010
12 12 12 12 ,,, ,, , ,,, ,, , R b i a s eppqu eppqu eppqu eppqu   =−−−   (26)
Unfortunately, the sign and magnitude of this bias is again indeterminate. Under very restrictive
conditions one might be able to estimate the correct structure for the expenditure function and obtain
unbiased estimates of 
U C .
14 However, these conditions are unlikely to hold in practice and we would11
recommend instead that  1 ˆU C  be computed and report as what it is, a measure of the use value
stemming from the combined use of  1 x  and q, and acknowledging the missing components  2
U C   and
E C .
Now consider the case where the omitted price of good 2 is perfectly correlated with one
of the variables in the  2 x  equation. A likely candidate would seem to be  1 p . In particular, if  1 x
represents visits to a recreation site for the purpose of fishing and  2 x  represents visits to the same
site with the purpose of swimming, hiking, or any other activity, the perfect correlation of prices
is quite likely. Following Bockstael and Kling (1988), suppose the prices of the two commodities
are related in a linear fashion, so that
212 1 p p φφ =+ , (27)
where  1 φ  and  2 φ  are constants. In this case, estimation of the linear model in (21) omitting  2 p
will yield the following properties of the estimated coefficients
11 2 1 ˆ () E αα βφ =+ (28)
and
11 2 2 ˆ () E ββ β φ =+ . (29)
In this case, the relationship between  1 p  and  2 p  is embedded in the estimated demand function
for  1 x  since the estimated coefficients incorporate the relationship. What does this mean for the
recovery of  1
U C  and 
R U CC = ? As Bockstael and Kling (1988, p. 660) note in a similar situation,
by varying  1 p , we are implicitly varying  2 p  as well. Thus, when constructing  1
U C  using
equation (18), one is in fact computing
() ()
10 00
11 1 2 1 1 2 ,,, ,,,
U Cx p p q u d t x p p q u d t =− 

PP (30)
where the price path P corresponds to  1 p t =  and  212 p t φφ =+ . The remaining component of
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Again, without strong structural assumptions regarding the nature of preferences, the analyst is
unlikely to have an estimate of the functional form for  2 x , which in turn precludes the
computation of  2
U C

, leaving the  1
U C

 as that portion of 
R C  that is recoverable.
3.2.  Environmental Quality as an Essential Good – A Household Production Story
An alternative explanation for violations of weak complementarity arises from the
household production approach to consumer behavior.
15 In this case, individuals are assumed
hold preferences over a bundle of commodities  () 1,, M z z = z  . These commodities are in turn
produced by combining the market commodities (x) and the public good (q) through the
household production process  () ,, 0 tq = zx . If the production technology follows the simpler
structure with  () ,q = zz x , then consumer preferences take the form:
() , uu q   =   zx . (32)
As Freeman (1993, p. 149) notes, weak complementarity in this context corresponds to the
assumption that x is an essential input to the production of the  j z ’s. However, this need not be
the case. Indeed, if x is not an essential input and q is, then weak complementarity does not hold
and there is more to 
R C  than the “use” value associate with the  i x ’s. Under this interpretation,
there is an intrinsic value to the public good not captured by its association with the market. Thus,
even when x is not consumed, changes to the public good alter consumer welfare.
16
What distinguishes this from the previous case is that there are no omitted variables or
other mis-specifications in the empirical model. Thus, the model the analyst is estimating is in
fact the true model. Consequently, the welfare measure 
R C  derived from equation (6) is fully
revealable in this case.
We complete this section by noting one additional explanation for violations of weak13
complementarity. The previous two explanations have taken the “high road”, using theory and
modeling issues to explain the results. The “low road” of explanation may lie in the
econometrics.
17 As Randel (citation) has pointed out, prices in revealed preference models are
likely measured with error, as are other variables entering the model that depend on an
individual’s recall while responding to a survey. Thus it may in fact be that weak
complementarity holds, but we reject this in preference estimation due to data problems.
Likewise, it may be that the utility function we estimate is incorrect or not sufficiently flexible
and we reject weak complementarity although it would hold for the individual’s true preference
function.
 18  While these explanations may of course be true and undoubtedly contribute
somewhat to deviations from weak complementarity, they could in fact be said about any
empirical study. Thus the econometric issues may be orthogonal to the issues we examine here.
As in any empirical study, one should seek to obtain the most reliable data and specify the most
flexible model possible. Given this, the pragmatic issue of obtaining the proper welfare measures
in any revealed preference model still remains. We examine this empirically using the Kuhn-
Tucker model in the following section
4.  EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
We investigate these issues empirically using data obtained from the 1997 Iowa Wetlands
survey conducted at Iowa State University. The purpose of this survey was to obtain information
on Iowans’ use of wetlands in the state as well as attitudes towards wetlands preservation and
conservation. A survey of 6000 Iowa households was drawn from the general population and
from state hunting and fishing license holders, from which 3131 useable surveys were returned.
As part of the survey each individual was given a map of the state, divided into fifteen zones, and
asked to record the number of visits to wetlands made to each of the zones during 1997.
Of particular interest for this example are the responses of individuals living in the north-
central part of the state encompassing three of the zones. This area is known as the Des Moines
lobe of the North American prairie pothole region. The prairie pothole region is a large, fairly14
unique section of the continent, including parts of Iowa, Minnesota, the Dakotas, and the
Canadian plains provinces. The area is dotted with indentations (formed by retreating glaciers) in
otherwise flat landscapes, which are wet for at least part of the year. This type of wetland is ideal
habitat for many types of wildlife including ducks and pheasants, and is important at both the
local and continental level. At the local level, these wetlands and the surrounding upland areas
provide opportunities for outdoor recreation, including hunting, hiking, and wildlife viewing. In
this application we model visits to the three prairie pothole zones by individuals living in the
region. This sub-sample includes 296 respondents, of whom 191 visited a wetland in the region
during 1997. Of these individuals, only eleven visited wetlands in each of the three zones
comprising the prairie pothole region. A model is therefore necessary which can account for non-
participation and corner solutions in the data, and allow specification of preferences that are
sufficiently general to allow both use and non-use components to resource values.
The Kuhn-Tucker model is attractive for this purpose. The model begins with
maximization of the consumer’s direct utility function subject to income and non-negativity
constraints. The first order conditions, given the potential for non-consumption of a subset of the
goods, take the form of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Formally the consumer solves the problem
, (,,,,)
z Max u z q
x x γ ε γ ε γ ε γ ε (33)
s.t.
' z y +≤ px (34)
and
0, 0, 1, , j z xj M ≥≥ =  (35)
where  () u ⋅  is assumed to be a quasi-concave, increasing, and continuously differentiable function
of () ,z x ,  1 (, , ) M x x ′ = x   is a vector of goods to be analyzed (recreation trips), z is the numeraire
good,  1 (,, ) M p p ′ = p   is a vector of commodity prices (travel costs), y denotes annual income,15
γ  is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and  1 (, , ) M ε ε ′ ε=   is a vector of random
disturbances capturing the variation in preferences in the population. Note that a priori, the
specification of utility need not in general exhibit the property of weak.
Assuming the numeraire good is necessary, the first order conditions for this problem are
given by
; 0; 0, 1,..., . jj z j j jj z up u x x up u j M  ≤≥− = =  (36)
Given assumptions on the structure of the utility function, the KT conditions can be rewritten as
( , , , ); 0; ( , , , ) 0, 1,..., , jj j j jj g yx x g y j M εγ εγ  ≤≥ − = =  xq xq (37)
where  () j g ⋅  is a function of observed variables and parameters to be estimated, determined by the
choice of functional form for utility. Equation (37) provides the basis for forming estimating
equations for the model. Given a distribution for the error terms, the probability of observing each
individual’s outcome in the data can be determined from (37) and maximum likelihood used to
recover estimates of the parameters.
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Because of the non-negativity constraints, the demand system, and hence the indirect
utility function of interest for welfare analysis, is non-differentiable. For example, if there are M
sites available, there are 2
M  different combinations of sites that can be visited, including the
possibility of not visiting any of the sites during the season. Therefore there is an equal number of
potential demand systems, conditional on the demand regime. Let
{ } { } { } { } { } { } { } , 1 , 2 ,..., , 1,2 ,..., 1, ,..., 1,2,... M MM Ω= ∅ (38)
denote the collection of all possible demand patterns and  (, , , , ) vq y ω γ ε p  denote the indirect
utility function when the individual is restricted to the commodities indexed by ω ∈Ω. Note the
maximization process implies the conditional indirect utility function is a function of only the
prices of consumed goods, while the absence of weak complementarity implies the conditional16
indirect utility function may in fact be a function of all quality attributes, regardless if they are
consumed. The individual’s unconditional indirect utility function is then given by
()( ) { } ,,,, m a x ,,,, vq y v q y ωω ω γ ε γ ε
∈Ω = pp . (39)
Note that this corresponds to the indirect utility function,  () ,, vq y p , which is in fact the separable
component of the overall utility function given in (2). As noted above, revealed preference
methods can at best expose information on resource values given by 
R C . In the particular case of
the KT model, this is implicitly defined by
() { } () { } 01
01 max , , , , max , , , ,
R vq y vq y C ωω ωω
ωω
γ ε γ ε
∈Ω ∈Ω
=− pp (40)
and may, if preferences are not weakly complementary, include indirect use value. Direct use
value, or 
U C  as defined in equation (13), is given by by 
UR I U CC C =−, where 
IU C  is implicitly
defined by
() { } () { } 01
01 max , , , , max , , , ,
IU vq y vq y C ωω ωω
ωω
γ ε γ ε
∈Ω ∈Ω
=− pp  , (41)
where  ω p   is the vector of choke prices for each of the demand regimes. Note that the preferences
in (33) are characterized via estimation up to an unobserved vector of error terms, and that no
closed form for the compensating surpluses given by equations (40) and (41) exist. Given an
estimated distribution for the error term, however, Monte Carlo integration can be used to obtain
estimates of the expected value of the surplus measures.
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Estimation of the KT model requires specification of the functional form for the utility
function and the error terms. We assume utility is given by a version of the LES utility function
such that
1




Uz q x z εθ
=
γε = Ψ + +  xq (42)
where  () , δθ γ= , j Ψ  is a quality index give by  01 ( , ) exp( ) jjj j j qp h ε δδ ε Ψ= + + , and  j ph  is a
site quality variable equal to the pheasant count in the 
th j  site if the individual indicated17
possession of a hunting or fishing license and equal to zero otherwise. The price of visiting each
of the sites is computed in the standard manner, using the round trip travel distance and one third
of the marginal wage rate as the opportunity cost of travel time. While restrictive in some ways
the LES utility function is convenient for this study in that it does not a priori impose weak





= ∂∂ Ψ =  and preferences are
weakly complementary while if  1 j θ >  preferences conversely do not exhibit weak
complementarity. Thus, for this specific specification of utility, estimation of θ  provides a
parametric test for weak complementarity. To foreshadow what is to come, rejection of weak
complementarity requires the analyst to make decisions on the proper welfare measure, based on
which explanation for non-weakly complementary preferences is most plausible.
It is further assumed that the random terms are distributed independent, identical extreme
value. While more general distributions are possible (see Phaneuf, et. al), this specification
provides a closed form for the likelihood function and allows direct re-sampling from the
estimated error distribution, significantly simplifying the estimation and welfare calculation
process.
21 Given these assumptions, we estimate the three-site KT model using the prairie pothole
sub-sample from the Iowa Wetlands data. For comparison purposes, we also estimate a standard
four-good repeated multinomial logit model.
22 The results of estimation are presented in Table 1.
We estimate two specifications of the KT model, an unrestricted and a restricted version.
The unrestricted model freely estimates  j θ  for each site while the restricted model restricts each
of these parameters to equal to one, imposing weak complementarity on the preference structure.
Both models are parsimonious in parameters, and in each case all estimates are significantly
different from zero at better than the 1% confidence level. As expected, increases in pheasant
counts at each site will increase utility and positively affect the demand for trips. These
parameters characterize preferences, which can then be used to calculate elasticities and other
measures of policy interest.18
Of particular interest for the topic of this paper are the estimates of  j θ . Note that in each
case the estimates are significantly different from one at any reasonable confidence level, and that
the restricted model is rejected against the unrestricted model in a likelihood ratio test at the 1%
significance level. Thus, for this specification of utility in this application, weak complementarity
is rejected. Welfare calculations corresponding to equation (40) above will contain not only pure
use value, but also indirect use. The analyst must thus determine which is the correct measure to
report. For this example, we consider the effects of a 20% increase in pheasant counts throughout
the prairie pothole region and calculate three KT welfare measures, along with the comparable
repeated multinomial logit welfare measure. Each of these could be considered correct under
various assumptions.
If we adopt the interpretation of the omitted variables story---that weak complementarity
is rejected because the model does not explicitly model the demand for goods which are also in
the weakly complementary set of goods--- then it will be most correct to calculate and report 
U C .
The degree to which our estimate of 
U C is biased will depend, as indicated earlier, on the degree
of correlation between the prices, the functional form of demand, and the magnitude of the cross
price effect. Although the magnitude of the bias is clearly an empirical question that will vary
across applications, we suspect that in most cases it will be small to not be a significant cause of
concern. Thus, the omitted variables interpretation would suggest that the analyst report a use
value of about $88 per season for a 20% increase in the pheasant population. It is useful to once
again note that this value does not consider the change in values of the weakly complementary
goods which are not included in the model.
In contrast, if we believe the model is correctly specified and the rejection of weak
complementarity is evidence of the essential nature of q, then it would seem most correct to
calculate and report the full value of 
R C , including both the pure use value and the residual
indirect use value.  Thus, the analyst would report that a 20% increase in the pheasant population19
would yield about  $322 of surplus. The analyst might further break this value down into the two
components of use (about $88) and non-use (about $234), but it is not clear that there is any
intrinsic value to doing the latter.
In either of the previous two cases, it will be important for the analyst to clearly identify
which welfare measure has been calculated and reported. It is apparent from the large differences
in the magnitudes of the welfare measures that this decision has potentially large implications for
the outcome of benefit cost comparisons and other uses of welfare numbers.
Finally, for comparison we also present welfare calculation arising from the restricted KT
model and the repeated logit model. Interestingly, the welfare result from the logit model of $36
for 
R U CC =  is of a comparable order of magnitude to the use value from the unrestricted KT
model. In contrast, the use value obtained from the ex ante restricted KT model is the implausibly
high $778. This provides some antidotal support for estimating unrestricted preferences in KT
models, rather than ex ante imposing weak complementarity.
5.  FINAL REMARKS
In this paper, we investigate the implications of non weakly complementary preferences
for applied welfare analysis using revealed preference data. Although existence value can not be
measured using RP data, there is a component of total value outside of standard use value
(deemed "indirect use" value here) for which revealed preference approaches may be able to shed
some light. The purpose of this paper is to highlight this issue and begin to investigate its
implications for welfare measurement. Our motivation is pragmatic, in that the recently available
KT model does not a priori impose weak complementarity, requiring the analyst to determine
which is the correct welfare measure to report. Critical to understanding welfare measurement
when weak complementarity does not hold is to first understand and define the relevant
components of total value. We do so with a particular focus on identifying the components of
total value that are recoverable, at least potentially, from revealed preference data and models.20
We propose two explanations for why weak complementarity may be violated in any
particular empirical setting, and mention a third: weak complementarity with sets of goods, a
household production model with quality is an essential input, and econometric explanations. We
note that the implications for welfare analysis are quite different in each of the cases, and that the
proper welfare measure will depend on the judgement of the analyst. Those inherently uneasy
about anything beyond direct use value in revealed preference models will likely be most
comfortable with the first interpretation and the associated welfare measures.
The Kuhn-Tucker model is a convenient framework for investigating these issues
empirically as weak complementarity does not have to be imposed ex ante, but rather can be
tested for in the context of the model.  An application of this model to wetlands usage in the
prairie pothole region of the state of Iowa suggests that weak complementarity does not hold
between visits to wetlands and pheasant populations. Further, the two interpretations of why weak
complementarity does not hold yield welfare magnitudes of sufficient difference to warrant
further investigation into these issues. Steps in this direction may include estimating KT models
using more general functional forms for utility and/or the error distribution.21
Table 1: Estimation and Welfare Results
Model

























0 β NA NA 1.69
(0.07)
y β NA NA 0.05
(0.001)
p β NA NA 0.023
(0.001)






20% increase in pheasant









Note: Standard errors on welfare measures computed via 200 bootstrap replications.22
6.  APPENDIX
The purpose of this appendix is to demonstrate that the welfare decomposition in
equation (5) and originally proposed by Hanemann (1988) holds only if the marginal utility of
income is constant. To see this, note that, from equation (6), 
R C  can be equivalently defined as
implicitly solving the equality
() ( )
00 01 ,, ,,
R vq y vq y C =− pp . (43)
However, equations (4) and (7) imply that:
() ( )
()






Tv q yq Tv qy C q
Tv qy C q
   =−   






where  y yC ≡−   . This in turn implies that
() ( )
00 01 ,, ,, .
R vq y vq y C =− pp  (45)
Clearly, equations (43) and (45) will generally hold only if the marginal utility of income is
constant.23
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8.  FOOTNOTES
1 This is a generalization of Freeman's (1993, pp. 123-24) "hopeless" case in which he assumes that q enters
only as strongly separable component of utility.
2 It is assumed that  () , Tu q is strictly increasing in u.
3 A proof of this is provided in the Appendix.
4 Obviously, one could reverse the order of compensation by defining 
R C   such that:
() ()
00 1 01 1 ,,, ,, ,
R Tv q yq Tv qy C q    =−    pp   ,
where  y yC ≡−   . In this case, the decomposition would be 









Tv q y q Tv q yC q
Tv qy C C q
  =−  





There are two reasons to prefer the decomposition in (8). First, from a practical point view, since the
functional form for  () , Tq ⋅  can never be identified from revealed preference data, C   cannot be computed
and, consequently, neither can  y   or 
R C  . Second, even if C   was known, as long as q is a normal good
R R CC >  , so that 
R C  represents the largest portion of total value that can be extracted from behavioral
data.
5 The compensation 
E C  is similar to Carson, Flores, and Mitchell’s (1999) notion of “passive-use” value;
i.e., “…those portions of total value … that are unobtainable using indirect measurement techniques which
rely on observed market behavior.”(p. 100). We have chosen not to use the term “passive-use” value,
however, to avoid confusion with notion of indirect use (e.g., reading magazines, etc., concerning a
recreation site) that is included in 
R C .
6 See LaFrance (1992) for additional discussion regarding testing of the weak complementarity restriction.26
7 In Freeman’s terms 
IU C  could also be referred to as “non-use” value. We avoid this terminology here to
prevent confusion, since in other works “non-use” value and “existence” value have been used
synonymously. As previously noted, in this case 
E C  amd 
IU C  have quite different interpretations.
8 In fact, as Hanemann (1988, p. 1) notes, decompositions analogous to (13) and (14) are valid for any
intermediate prices, although the terminologies of use or non-use values would be less intuitive.
9 For the time being, we ignore the problem of income effects in the demand equations.
10 See, e.g., Phaneuf, Kling, and Herriges (2000).
11 See, e.g., Bockstael and McConnell (1983) or Freeman (1993).
12 The expression in (17) represents one way to write the compensating (or equivalent) variation, based on the
path of integration ()() () () () ()
00 0
1 2 12 12 ,,, p pp q pp q p q →→   . Of course, the same welfare compensation
would result if the alternative path () () () () () ()
00 0
12 12 1 2 ,, , p p ppq pqpq →→    had been used, yielding
12
TUU CCC =+  . More generally, the welfare measure can be expressed as a line integral that is path independent
for the Hicksian welfare measures. See Bockstael and Kling (1988) for the derivation and discussion.
13 For the linear model in (21), it can be shown that  1 bias  is in fact zero on average if: (1) the initial price
for good 1 (i.e., 
0
1 p ) is the same across all households, (2) the initial price of good 2 (
0
2 p ) is symmetrically
distributed about the population mean (
0
2 p ), and (3) all households are users (i.e.,  1 0 x > ) prior to (after) a
quality increase (decrease). If condition (3) is violated,  1 bias  will on average be negative (positive) for a
quality increase (decrease).
14 Ideally, the analyst know that the second good exists and be able to realistically impose sufficient
structure on preferences to allow all of parameters of the expenditure function to be recovered through the
estimated demand function for good 1 (e.g., in an LES system). The resulting  R bias  would then be limited
if 
0
2 p  varied little, if at all, in the population.
15 See, for example, Becker (1965), Lancaster (1966), and Bockstael and McConnell (1983).27
16 While difficult to quantify, one can tell stories consistent with these types of preferences. For example, if
an individual is unable to go fishing with his friends because of other commitments but later enjoys hearing
stories about how great the fishing was, he is producing utility from the environmental good without
consuming the complement. Thus, weak complementarity does not hold in the structure of the individual’s
preferences for the single good.
17 Thanks to Ted McConnell for suggesting these descriptive titles.
18 For example, Phaneuf, Kling, and Herriges (2000) reject the weak complementarity restriction using a
linear expenditure system utility function. It may in fact be that this function for preferences is not
sufficiently flexible and that the test is rejecting the LES model and not weak complementarity per se. This
is, of course, a possibility and further research is need into the use of flexible functional forms in Kuhn-
Tucker framework. However, as the LES form is a legitimate preference structure, the question remains as
to what one would do if LES preferences apply and violations of weak complementarity arise.
19 See Phaneuf, Kling, and Herriges (2000) or Phaneuf and Herriges (2000) for further details on
implementing the KT model.
20 See Phaneuf, Kling, and Herriges for a discussion of the necessary algorithm for computing welfare measures
in the Kuhn-Tucker model. This process, while computationally intense, is conceptually simple once the
conditional indirect utility functions are recovered.
21 Additional details on estimation and welfare calculation can be found in Phaneuf, et.al or Phaneuf and
Herriges. Example GAUSS programs for estimation and welfare measures for the LES/EV model are
available from the authors upon request.
22 The repeated multinomial logit model conditional indirect utility functions are given by
( ) , 1,...,3, jy j p j j Vy pp hj ββ ε =− + + =  and  00 0 y Vy ββ ε =+ +  for the option of not making a trip.
Fifty choice occasions were used and income (y) was calculated as annual income divided by the number of
choice occasion.